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Book Reviews
THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAw.

By Winfred Over-

holser. New York. Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1953.
Pp. x, 147. $3.50.
Unquestionably, Dr. Winfred Overholser, Superintendent of Saint Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D. C., past
president of the American Psychiatric Association and a
leader in the field of forensic psychiatry1 is particularly
qualified to be chosen as the recipient of the first Isaac Ray
Award of the American Psychiatric Association. This award
is granted annually to that individual who, in the judgment
of the Award Committee, "is most worthy by reason of his
contribution to the improvement of the relations of Law
and Psychiatry" and the recipient is expected to lecture at
some university which has both a law school and a medical
school.
The Psychiatrist and the Law is based on Dr. Overholser's lectures delivered at Harvard University in November, 1952, in which he considers four main aspects of
psycho-legal interrelation. In the first section, The Substance of Psychiatry, Dr. Overholser recognizes that both
law and psychiatry deal essentially with human beings and
their conduct among themselves. It might logically be expected that each field should have an interest in the other
and that each should benefit by whatever advances the
other may have made. However, he points out the indisputable fact that the law in certain fields has lagged behind psychiatric progress and has refused to incorporate
within itself much of the recent otherwise accepted psychiatric conclusions and points of view. Though readily
admitting that the law should not attempt to lead, citing
the noble experiment of Prohibition as proof thereof, he
believes "it should at least follow at a sufficient distance to
be able to keep in sight of the rest of the procession."2
'Some of his published writings are: Psychiatry and the Courts in
Massachusetts, 19 J. Cr. L. 75 (1928) ; The History and Operation of the
Briggs Law in Massachusetts, 2 Law and Contemp. Prob. 436 (1935) ; The
Voluntary Admission Law, 3 Am. J. of Psychiatry 475 (1924) ; The Briggs
Law of Massachusetts - A Review and an Appraisal, 25 J. Cr. L. 859
(1935) ; with Weihofen, Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 24 Tex. L. Rev.
307 (1946); Psychiatric EBpert Testimony in Criminal Cases Since
McNaghten - A Review, 42 J.Cr. L. 283 (1951) ; with Richmond, HANDBOOK
OF PSYCHIATRY (1952).
' OvmHoLsEM, 7.
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The law has accepted a number of advances of science,
viz: blood grouping for testing parenthood in paternity
cases and for identification of blood stains, and tests for
alcoholic content of breath or blood in intoxication cases.'
There is a tendency toward a very limited acceptance of
electro-encephalograph or "brain wave" tracings and "lie
detector" tests.
Though the law has acknowledged and made use of the
so-called "scientific" findings of branches of medicine there
has been no comparatively ready recognition or adoption of
the theories, conclusions and probable aid of modern
psychiatry.
Dr. Overholser lists some of the lawyer's reasons for his
skepticism toward the psychiatrist and seeks to refute the
validity of his arguments. It is contended that the psychiatrist makes extravagant claims for his specialty, that
he submits unreliable diagnoses and that his testimony is
fantastic because of the frequent divergence of views even
among colleagues in the field.4
The author contends that extravagant claims are not the
habit of the majority of psychiatrists. A very small minority, though admittedly a vocal one, may have overrated
present psychiatric knowledge. This is not a failing common to all or even to many. The psychiatrist's diagnosis, if
not reliable, is only untrustworthy when expressed in terms
of concepts peculiar to the law. As to disagreement between psychiatrists, the author ably confutes this proposition by alluding to the obvious parallel within the legal
profession itself. ". . . lawyers and even judges do not always agree! Dissenting opinions are far from unknown,
and certainly if lawyers all agreed there would be precious
few contests in court!"5
Dr. Overholser includes in this section a masterfully
compact classification of mental disorders and a brief treatment of the history and development of psychiatry, its advances and its present position. He concludes with an explanation of the apparent ambiguity of psychiatric diagnosis; an admonition of Isaac Ray that a mental disorder
is a "disease, and as is the case with all other diseases, the
fact of its existence is never established by a single diag3The

Compulsory Use of Chemical Tests For Alcoholic Intoxication -

A Symposium, 14 Md. L. Rev. 111 (1954). At the time of going to press,
House Bill No. 41 had been introduced in the 1955 Session of the Maryland
Legislature, to authorize the use of chemical tests in intoxication cases.
'Michael,
Psychiatry and the Criminal Law, 21 A. B. A. J. 271 (1935).
5
OvERHoLsER, 24.
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nostic symptom, but by the whole body of symptoms, no
particular one of which is present in every case."
Some Differences of Viewpoint, the second chapter, sets
forth a number of material differences between legal and
psychiatric viewpoints and pleads for a greater rapprochement of the two fields. One important contrast in point
of view is the tendency of the law to preserve the status
quo or at least to move only very slowly towards acceptance of new ideas or scientific data. The legal doctrine
of stare decisis, the principle that court decisions should
stand as precedents for future guidance, well illustrates
such a tendency.
A further and more serious divergence in viewpoint
rests on the assumption of the law that most acts are performed on the basis of reasoning. There are, of course, exceptions such as a condition of drunkenness which may prevent premeditation and serve therefore to mitigate punishment. However, the law does not generally recognize the
existence of "other factors at work in conduct than reason
and that there are circumstances under which emotional
drives, little understood by the actor, may cause him to
perform acts even against his will."8 The author cites
kleptomania as a prominent example.
It may be noted that some states recognize the possibility that offenses may be committed under the influence
of unconscious drives of the impulsive variety, the "irresistible impulse." However, other states, Maryland among
them, do not recognize such a defense 9 many preferring
to treat the act as the result rather of an unresisted
impulse.'0
The belief that conscious conduct, known to be wrong,
is reprehensible conduct is the principle behind the McNaghten case." The rule of this case, though indeed it was
not a case at all but only a series of answers to questions
based on a case already decided, is the foundation of the
OvERnoLsaa, 36.

How stare decisis operates in the scientific field is well illustrated by
State v. Terry, 173 N. C. 761, 92 S. E. 154 (1917), which rested on the
precedent of State v. Brandon, 53 N. C. 463, 468 (1862), In which it was
said:
"'To know the right and still the wrong pursue' proceeds from a
perverse will, brought about by the seductions of the evil one. . . . If
the prisoner knew -that what he did was wrong, the law presumes that
he had the power to resist it against all supernatural agencies and
holds him amenable to punishment."
8OVERHOLsE, 42.

9Spencer v. State, 69 Md. 28, 3 A. 809 (1888).
10WmHFoFN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRPmiNAL DmmNsE (1954), 94 et seq.
u 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
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Anglo-American theory of criminal responsibility. The
rule was propounded in 1843 at a time when the so-called
compartment theory of mental functioning was in vogue
and when there prevailed an interest in phrenology. 2 Today
the McNaghten Rule or modifications thereof is still the test
of responsibility in many jurisdictions notwithstanding the
repudiation of the compartment theory and an almost complete distinterest in phrenology save by those who may
stroll resort boardwalks. Though the tests of legal responsibility have varied little, treatment of mental disorder has
changed markedly. 8 Perhaps the most frequent criticism
of the rule "is that it covers only disorders of the cognitive
or intellectual phase of the mind, and makes no allowance
characterized by deficiency or destruction of
for disorders
14
volition".
Dr. Overholser disparages what he terms "the law's
devotion to the dichotomy of complete 'sanity' on the one
hand and complete 'insanity' on the other; the notion that
12A doctrine that specific mental faculties are localized in definite cerebral
regions, the degree of development of the faculty correlating with the
prominence of the region as indicated largely by the contour of the overlying skull.
3 Cf. THOMAS, THE MODERN PRACTICE OF PHYSIC (Philadelphia, 1817),
which sets forth some early forms of treatment:
"Cold bathing, by diminishing irritation, is a remedy by which
maniacs have been relieved, and sometimes entirely cured, especially
when applied in a certain manner. This consists in throwing the person
into cold water by surprise, by detaining him in it for some length of
time, and pouring water frequently on his head, while the whole of
the body except the head, is immersed; and thus managing the process,
so as that, with the -assistance of some fear a refrigerant effect may
be produced." 256.
"Dr. Cox speaks highly of swinging as a remedy in mania, and he
recites many cases where 'the happiest effects were derived from making
use of it. We are told by him, that it may be employed in the common
oscillatory way, or in a circular manner or whirl; the patient at the
same time sitting erect, or lying horizontally.
"When employed in the latter manner, Dr. Cox has, after a very
few circumvolutions, witnessed its soothing, lulling effects: the mind
has become tranquil, and the body quiescent; a degree of vertigo has
often followed, and this has been succeeded by the most refreshing
slumbers: an object the most desirable in every case of madness, and
procured with the utmost difficulty in general. Maniacs, he has noticed,
are not usually sensible to the action of the common oscillatory swing,
although it affords an excellent mode of secure confinement, and of
harmless punishment. By the protracted action of the circular swing,
or whirl, he has sometimes seen the patient almost deprived of his
locomotive powers; and although it required the combined strength
and address of several experienced attendants to place him (in) it,
still he has been taken out of it by a single person: the most profound
sleep has followed, and this has been succeeded by convalescence, and
a perfect recovery, without the assistance of any other means. One of
the most constant effects of swinging is a greater or less degree of
vertigo, attended by pallor, nausea, and vomiting, and frequently by
an evacuation of the contents of the bladder." 258-9. (in) added.
1, WErHOFEN, op. cit., supra, n. 10, 67.
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there are no gradations or shadings."15 There is a wide
range between the robust athlete and the dying invalid
and somewhere between these two extremes most of us are
found. So, similarly, there is a spread between the mentally
balanced individual and the regressed schizophrenic. In
the paranoic, various shadings of belief can also be found,
from the honest mistake to the fantastic delusion.
The author points out how emotional factors may not
only affect individual conduct but also may color or even
bring about legislative enactments. Fear and hatred, he
believes, are at the source of the archaic whipping laws of
Delaware," and Maryland 7 and the modern flood of "sex
psychopath" statutes. 8
The latter legislation, though probably caused by public
excitement and disgust, is unwittingly well based since "sex
psychopaths", though mentally abnormal, are amenable to
treatment. These statutes show an advance. They indicate
belated acknowledgement by the law that there are persons who are neither sane nor insane but who fall somewhere in between and should be prescribed for accordingly.
Thus there is a middle ground which calls for special
handling and for an indeterminate period of segregation for
treatment, or if treatment fails then continued confinement. 9
Interest in sex psychopath laws and readiness of the
public to believe such charges have "some interesting psychological roots in the unconscious strivings of the average
citizen, . . ."20 It is important therefore to look carefully
at the psychological bases of the evidence in order to guard
the accused from conviction on unsupported evidence.
Overholser warns that ".... false accusations of sex offenses
may be made not only by honest mistake of identification
but deliberately for purposes of blackmail or revenge, as a
result of a fantasy on the part of the accuser, or even as a
symptom of frank psychosis."'" Therefore, the rule requiring corroborated evidence in cases involving rape should
not be relaxed. In fact, the author urges an extension of
this rule to cover more "sex crimes." Because in the last
analysis deduction or judgment is involved, all evidence
15 OVERHOLsER, 45.

'"Del. Code Ann. (1953), Title 11, Sec. 3908.
1"Md. Code (1951), Art. 27, Secs. 12-13, Repealed by Md. Laws 1953,
Ch. 411.
GUTTMACHER, SEX OFFENSES (1951), 120 et seq.

19Cf. Maryland's Defective Delinquent Statute, Md. Code (1951), Art. 31B.
0OVERHOLSLER, 51.
2OVERHOLSER, 53.
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is in fact opinion. For this reason, the mental state of the
witness should be of interest to the court.
Emotion or mental state may also affect jurors. Overholser cites cases in which the jury finding was directly
contrary to the instructions of the court or the unequivocal
report of the examining doctors. 2 Such a possibility is of
particular importance in Maryland where the jury in criminal cases is judge of both law and fact.23 Thus in Maryland
there is more likelihood of a non-conforming finding by
the jury, a result which, of course, would not be a ground
for reversal on appeal. The option, therefore, of court or
jury trial should be of grave concern to the defense
attorney.
A related problem in which the emotional aspect has
bearing is found in the so-called "mental anguish" cases in
tort law.24 Although recognizing the possibility of malingering, Overholser points out that actual symptoms typical of
conversion hysteria, viz., anesthesia, hysterical blindness
or paralysis may be found without the presence of a demonstrable physical basis. He notes that frequently these symptoms are not permanent and that psychotherapy may alleviate them and adds a further interesting truth, that in
some cases the sympathy-provoking, but disabling symptoms have disappeared after a substantial verdict in favor
of the plaintiff. Overholser suggests a lump sum settlement
when such a situation is suspected. It is not necessarily a
question of malingering but rather an unconscious attempt
of the plaintiff to obtain secondary gain, a common characteristic of neurosis.2 1 A continuance of payments which depend upon the existence of the neurotic symptoms would
tend to prolong or even perpetuate the complaints; this
though the patient may be consciously ignorant of the cause
of his continued disablement.
2In
Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 169 P. 2d 442 (1946), Charles
Chaplin was charged with being the father of a child. Blood tests were
made by doctors chosen and agreed upon by the parties. The tests showed
that Chaplin could not have been the father but because the mother testified
that there was seasonable access the court ruled that there was conflicting
evidence and submitted the question to the jury. The jury found that
Chaplin was the father.

Md. Const., Art. 15, Sec. 5.
U Balto.

& Ohio R.R. Co. v. Harris, 121 Md. 254, 88 A. 282 (1913) ; Tea
Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1930) ; Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md.
397, 165 A. 182 (1933) ; Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A. 2d 923 (1951),
noted 12 Md. L. Rev. 202 (1951) ; Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A. 2d
879 (1952).
21GUTTMACHEI

AND WaIHOFEN, PSYCMATY

reviewed 14 Md. L. Rev. 107 (1954).

AND

THE LAW

(1952),

47,
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In the third chapter, The Mental Patient And The Hospital, the author traces the history of mental hospitals in
the United States from the colonial days when provision
was made for only the "furiously mad" to the present day
when there are more than one-half million patients at an
annual out-of-pocket cost of approximately 350 million
dollars. When to this staggering amount is added the loss
of earning power of the hospitalized individuals the resulting astronomical figure indicates the social and economic
importance of the problem.
Because a high percentage of those who are mentally ill
fail to recognize the fact, no physical disability perhaps
being evident, and because the patient is likely to sense the
stigma attaching to a mental institution, some method of
involuntary commitment is necessary. The author believes
that the admitting authority should properly be medically
trained and experienced in dealing with the sick. However,
involuntary commitment raises the problem of the patient's
civil rights and for this reason judicial authorities have historically dealt with the problem.
Overholser decries the fact that in the majority of jurisdictions commitment has an unmistakable criminal odor.
From the standpoint of psychotherapeutics, for the patient
to be exposed to what he has reason to believe is penal is
unquestionably harmful. Whatever feeling of guilt he may
have is reasserted, reaffirmed and aggravated. Formal proceedings which are common in many jurisdictions not only
tend to harm the patient directly but also may lead to undesirable postponement of hospitalization. The family is
fearful of unfavorable publicity and the consequent loss
of the precious prestige of possessing only relatives of unquestionably sound mind.
Several reasons have been given for the need of judicial
authority in involuntary commitment, viz., deprivation of
liberty, a concept popularly allocated to the courts, and the
fear of improper confinement brought about by unsympathetic or venal relatives. As to the first, Dr. Overholser
questions the distinction made between involuntary confinement for mental illness on the one hand and tuberculosis, smallpox or leprosy on the other. As to the alleged
danger of improper confinement the author believes this
argument to be without validity; rather it is a fiction inspired by Mrs. E. P. W. Packard,26 fostered by novels and
periodicals and perpetuated by a credulous public. He
2PACKARD,

MODERN PERSECUTION OR INSANE

ford 1873, 2 vols.).

AsYLuMs

UNvEILED

(Hart-
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is "convinced'27 that 'railroading' is one of the rarest of
phenomena.
A large majority of states have provided for voluntary
commitment. 8 However, limitation of hospital space may
restrict the value of such legislation. Maryland is cited as
an enlightened member of the bare majority which have
foreseen the need for emergency confinement. Under the
Maryland Code the emergency patient may be committed
upon the certificate of two physicians and his detention
continued until recovery or until he demands his release,
whereupon steps are taken for a formal court hearing.2 9
As to the patient's release from a mental hospital and
the dangers of premature release, the author's comments
dispel the often publicly accepted delusion that a mentally
ill patient never recovers. Several statistical studies are
cited which quite forceably point out the fallacy of such a
misconception. For example, the rate of offenses among
the general adult population in New York state was found
to be fourteen times as high as that among released mental
patients.3 0 The author reasonably concludes that the previously hospitalized mental patient is far from a menace to
peace and good order.
Premature release through habeas corpus or through
negligence is briefly touched upon. Dr. Overholser, though
he in no wise advocates the suppression or abolition of
habeas corpus in the mental patient situation, suggests that
psychiatric advice from a neutral source should be obtained
by the court."'
It is the author's hope that the laws of the several states
gradually "will be brought more fully into line with the
modern concept of regarding the mentally ill person as a
patient, to be treated as are the other sick, not as a 'dan32
gerous' individual to be 'committed' as a quasi-criminal."
In the last chapter, The Psychiatrist As Witness, the
author begins by tracing the development of the xole of the
expert in court. Today's expert, particularly the psychiatrist, is still faced with antagonism and distrust. Dr.
Overholser cites instances in which the court has failed to
OVERHOLSER, 85.

IMd. Code (1951), Art. 59, Sec. 36.
Md. Code Supp. (1954), Art. 59, Sec. 1.
"POLLACH,
MENTAL DISEASE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (Utica, 1941, State
Hospitals Press), Ch. 16.
81Md. Code (1951), Art. 59, Sec. 7. This section does not require or suggest that the court seek psychiatric advice before granting or denying release under habeas corpus. However, a psychiatric opinion is customarily
sought.
10OvERHoLsER, 102.
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insist on qualified psychiatric experts when dealing with
mental disorder on the theory that since mental illness is a
matter within the "'common observation of men of ordinary education and experience'" a layman's opinion would
be competent. 8 Even more disturbing is a tendency toward
freer use of lay opinion evidence.34 The author strongly
condemns such an attitude on the ground that the evidence of non-medical opinion witnesses would be more misleading than the slight confusion which he concedes may
be caused by testimony of psychiatric experts. It is revealing that the alleged tendency toward admission of lay
opinion evidence does not exist except with regard to
psychiatric medical questions.
The objection constantly raised by the public that experts and notably psychiatric experts so often disagree is
very speedily and effectively invalidated by the author's
pointed reference to the same inherent characteristic among
members of the legal profession. As ably stated by a colleague interested in forensic psychiatry, "If the law is so
inexact a science that even the words of men are not clear
to other men, you must forgive us doctors for not always
being sure about the
obscure and unconscious meanings of
''35
the deeds of men.
Dr. Overholser is disturbed, though it is thought unduly
so, by the hypothetical question. He admits the need of
such a hearsay exception since it is within the province of
the trier of fact to pass upon the truth or falsity of the
evidence and not the function of one of the witnesses, i.e.,
the expert himself. However, he states that "the expert
may be put in a most unpleasant and unfair light. Furthermore, by being asked differing hypothetical questions by
the two sides, he may in the eyes of a non-too-perceptive jury appear
to be answering yes and no to the same
36
question".
As a matter of fact perhaps the hypothetical question is
actually a boon to the expert medical witness if viewed
from a somewhat different standpoint. Should the hypothetical question be abolished, the expert witness would
be forced to undertake an adjudicative role. He would have
to determine which set of facts were true and which were
3 OVIEHOLSER,

111.
"Citing McCormick, Some Observation8 Upon The Opinion Rule and
Expert Testimony, 23 Tex. L. Rev. 109 (1945).
Davidson, Psychiatristsin Administrationof Criminal Ju8tice, 45 J. Cr.
L. 12, 20 (1954).
OvK&HoLsxa, 113.
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false. This is the function of the jury; it is certainly not
a medical function. Indeed, the use of the hypothetical
question permits the psychiatrist to give a sound answer
to any hypothesis without the necessity of considering the
partiality, credibility, or accuracy of the witnesses who
present the history of the party in question.
A number of objections of the psychiatrist to participating in a court proceeding are well taken. However, some
of the reasons given for the expert's hesitation to serve in
court, for example, loss of valuable time from a busy practice, are not peculiar to the psychiatrist or medical witness.
Nor is the embarrassment which may be suffered upon
cross examination a monopoly of the medical expert, though
this may be one of his principal objections. According to
Davidson: "There is an arrogant sanctimony in the idea
that other witnesses should be subject to cross examination,
but that the psychiatrist deals with such
divinely estab3' 7
lished truths that he should be immune.
On the other hand, the psychiatric expert is the endproduct of long experience and training, a great deal of it
directed toward the unique attitude required in the doctorpatient relationship. He is conditioned to assume toward his
patient a supportive role. He is simply untrained and ill prepared for participation in an adversary proceeding. Small
wonder then that the role of expert witness may be repugnant to him. Unfortunate as it may be, the doctor's function
in court is that of a contestant in a "battle of the experts."
"The Doctor who undertakes to go into court to
testify as an expert witness must bear in mind that he
is stepping squarely into the middle of a fight. A trial
is not a scientific investigation. It is not a search for
objective truth. It is, as the lawyers say, an adversary
proceeding, in which the adversaries are allowed to
battle it out for themselves, restrained only to the extent that other contests - boxing matches, for example, - are controlled by rules of the game with the
judge performing '8roughly the same function as the
referee or umpire.
Dr. Overholser advocates the establishment of a panel
of experts one of which the court may appoint as amicus
curiae in a suitable case. This, of course, is a procedure
Davidson, supra, n. 35, 15.
GUT MACHER AND WEIHOYEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW (1952),

205.
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recommended for adoption recently in Maryland 9 Under
such a practice the objections raised by the medical expert
may be somewhat debatable. Though some question may
arise concerning the right of cross examination of the court
appointed expert, he is not immune. His evidence is necessarily prejudicial to one party. Therefore, he should be subject to questioning and cross examination by that party.
This is the view taken by the Model Code of Evidence, 0 and
is at present the practice followed by the Supreme Bench
of Baltimore City.
The author discusses at some length the Briggs Law of
Massachusetts 41 which, in brief provides that under certain
conditions the accused shall be examined with a view to
determining his mental condition and the existence of any
mental disease or defect which would affect his criminal
responsibility. A somewhat similar procedure is found in
several courts, among them the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, where psychiatric clinics have been established
which can be called upon for psychiatric advice in proper
cases.42 Dr. Overholser recommends increasing the number
of such clinics and widening their function to include civil
actions.
Throughout the book recognition of the strained relationship between the psychiatrist and the lawyer is apparent. Dr. Overholser has not stopped at the mere recognition
and statement of the problem. He has suggested changes
and procedures which if followed may lessen the chasm between psychiatry and jurisprudence. "It is one of the firmly
"... the Medical and Chirurgical Faculty at the request of this subcommittee has selected a group of doctors certified as being qualified
in their respective specialties to compose a panel, the members of which
will be available under reasonable circumstances to appear as neutral
witnesses when called by the Court .... This list of doctors ... will...
be made available to trial judges when in the conduct of litigation
the trial judge deems its use to be advisable. In Baltimore City
arrangements have been made by which payment for professional services rendered by the neutral medical witness will be received by him
from 'the Clerk of the Court without disclosure to him of the source
of the remuneration thus paid. Authority for the appointment of a
neutral medical witness is given the trial judge by Discovery Rule 5
of the General Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Court of
Appeals...."
Report of the Committee on Medicolegal Problems of the Maryland State
Bar Association and the Bar Association of Baltimore City, October 5, 1954.
See also: "Court Appointed Medical Experts", Daily Record, January 13,
and February 1, 1955. State and local Bar Associations have expressed
disapproval of the plan.
10 Rule 407.
"Ann. Laws Mass., Ch.123, Sec. 100A.
"The defense attorney, with the consent of the court, as well as the
prosecuting attorney, may obtain for the accused an examination conducted
by trained psychiatrists and psychologists.
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held traditions of American life that people of different
groups could work together very satisfactorily if only they
would try to understand each other's problems. 4 3 Such a
desirable understanding can be approached through joint
medico-legal symposiums for the practicing attorney and
doctor"' and perhaps even more effectively in the long run
by an attack upon misunderstanding, distrust and prejudice
through seminars and lectures earlier at the professional
student level.45
Hopefully, Dr. Overholser concludes, "We may safely
expect that with the development of mutual understanding
between the representatives of law and psychiatry the
adoption of the needed improvements
which we have dis4
cussed may be accelerated."
L. WH=rING FARINHOLT, JR.*

TxmuPEt
c ABORTION. Edited by Harold Rosen. New
York. Julian Press, Inc., 1954. Pp. xxi, 348. $7.50.
This book, on a large topic, consists of individual chapters by about twenty nationally known specialists, each of
whom discusses a particular phase. It is almost a panel presentation with contribution and comments on the various
facets by the editor, Dr. Rosen.
This, coupled with a foreword by competent authors on
the legal, psychiatric and obstetrical aspects, an excellent
glossary and autobiographical section, makes this book an
excellent reference for all those interested in this most important, widely discussed and little known subject. Here is
a reference which should be of help to all in medicine, law
and the social sciences. It is interesting that more than twothirds of the authors are psychiatrists or of allied profes"Davidson, 8upra, n. 35, 12.
"The following symposia, sponsored by the Committee on Medicolegal
Problems of the Maryland State Bar Association and the Bar Association
of Baltimore City, were held since 1951: Drug Addiction, The Doctor
in Court - Expert Medical Testimony, Euthanasia, Trauma and its Relation to Disease, The Medical Legal and Social Aspects of the Adoption Law,
Use and Abuse of Drugs and Cosmetics, The Compulsory Use of Chemical
Tests for Alcoholic Intoxication, The Control of Chronic Alcoholism.
" Several Law Schools now include in their curricula courses in Medicolegal Problems, viz., University of Maryland, Harvard, Yale, etc. An incidental yet probable consequence should be a closer rapprochement be-

tween the two professions.
OvEaHoLsia, 134.
Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
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sions. Thus there is a psychiatric flavor to a great portion
of this book and also to the problem itself.
Therapeutic abortion, undoubtedly, has been on the decrease in this country as well as in others. This has been
based on wider knowledge of disease and its association
with pregnancy, the newer concepts of drugs in relation to
disease, the definite trend of the psychiatrist to look upon
the psychiatric problems as a less frequent cause of the
interruption of pregnancy.
Part I of this book deals with the problem and its background. It consists of a discussion on criminal abortion,
the 'shrinking non-psychiatric indications for therapeutic
abortion and the psychosomatic approach to abortion and
abortion habit. The first two subjects are very concise and
somewhat exact. The third topic in this part deals with the
psychiatric phase of abortion and explains in detail the
problem of abortion habit which has been of great interest
to psychiatrists, obstetricians and gynecologists alike.
Part II, which deals with related problems, i.e., sterilization, the psychological significance of vasectomy, the hysterectomized patient, abortion habit, and emotional concomitance of sterility and fertility, was enjoyed by the reviewer, who was impressed by the number of apparently
psychiatric patients who had these problems. It is the impression of the reviewer, however, that many cases of
vasectomy and hysterectomy have been performed on
normal, healthy individuals (mentally and emotionally
stable) without any great consequences.
Part III deals with the historical review of ancient customs and cultures, their relation to pregnancy, its interruption, laws, ethics, religious implications and the legal
status of therapeutic abortion. While it was felt that too
much space was allotted to the ancient customs and cultures, there is no doubt that they may be of help in formulating our present thoughts. The religious implications and
the attitude of the various churches were most informative
and should be of interest to those confronted with this
phase of the problem. The legal status of therapeutic abortion is most important as this is a controversial point as regards medicine and law.
Part IV - "The Hospitalized Abortion-Requesting Patient", which is taken up in two parts, "The Abortion Problem in the General Hospital" and "Experiences in a Psychiatric Hospital", shows there has been a fairly insistent incidence of therapeutic abortion throughout the country and
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deals with methods of control. The establishment of committees of survey has gone a long way toward helping control the misuse of therapeutic abortion in a general hospital. Although the problems and experiences in a psychiatric hospital are somewhat different, they are most helpful
in the treatment of these hospital patients.
Part V, which deals with the psychiatric and psychotherapeutic considerations of this problem, is amply discussed in
three parts.
Part VI deals with the prevention of abortion, which is
much more important than treatment. This, with Part VII
should be widely read. The psychiatric aspects of conception and planned parenthood are reviewed in detail. The
closing chapters are the reflections of the psychiatrist and
gynecologist, which were read with great interest.
The tremendous scope of this book with such able contributors should interest all who are concerned with this
problem, the physician, the psychiatrist, the social worker
and the lawyer. However, one should be left with a gentle
reminder that all who seek help or who have therapeutic
abortions are certainly not necessarily psychiatric patients.
ERNEST I. CORNBROOKS, JR.*
* Associate Professor of Gynecology, School of Medicine, University of
Maryland.

